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Signed-off-by: Gergo Koteles <[email protected]>
An unwanted side effect of enabling the BRCMDBG config setting is redefining brcmf_info to be brcmf_err. This can be alarming to users and makes it harder to spot real errors, so don't do it. See: raspberrypi#4663 Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <[email protected]>
Add these missing V4L2 controls. Tested binned and full resolution modes in all four orientations using Raspberry Pi running libcamera. Signed-off-by: David Plowman <[email protected]>
Add a second (identical) set of device nodes to allow concurrent use of the ISP hardware by another user. This change effectively creates a second state structure (struct bcm2835_isp_dev) to maintain independent state for the second user. Node and media entity names are appened with the instance index appropriately. Further users can be added by changing the BCM2835_ISP_NUM_INSTANCES define. Signed-off-by: Naushir Patuck <[email protected]>
Fix a possible division by 0 bug when setting up the mmal port for the stats port. Signed-off-by: Naushir Patuck <[email protected]>
As happens occasionally, an upstream change has once again prevented spidev from being loaded via Device Tree. We now need "spidev" to be included in the new spi_device_id list, otherwise although the spidev driver gets loaded no /dev/spidev*.* entries will appear. Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <[email protected]>
The ft5x06 is unreliable in sending touch up events, so some touch IDs can become stuck in the detected state. Ensure that IDs that are unreported by the controller are released. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
If a dummy buffer is still active on a frame start, it indicates that this frame will be dropped. The explicit logging helps users identify performance issues. Signed-off-by: Naushir Patuck <[email protected]>
The I2C to the Atmel is very fussy, and locks up easily on Pi0-3 particularly on reads. The LCD power status is controlled solely by this driver, so rather than reading it back from the Atmel, use the cached status last set. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
Register 0x02 in the FT5x06 is TD_STATUS containing the number of valid touch points being reported. Iterate over that number of points rather than all that are supported on the device. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
See: raspberrypi/firmware#1065 Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <[email protected]>
panel-dpi doesn't know the bit depth, so in the same way that DPI is guessed for the connector type, guess that it'll be 8bpc. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
The "panel-dpi" compatible string configures panel from device tree, but it doesn't provide any way of configuring the bus format (colour representation), nor does it populate it. Add a DT parameter "bus-format" that allows the MEDIA_BUS_FMT_xxx value to be specified from device tree. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
The VL805 controller can't cope with the TR Dequeue Pointer for an endpoint being set to a Link TRB. The hardware-maintained endpoint context ends up stuck at the address of the Link TRB, leading to erroneous ring expansion events whenever the enqueue pointer wraps to the dequeue position. If the search for the end of the current TD and ring cycle state lands on a Link TRB, move to the next segment. See: raspberrypi#3919 Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bell <[email protected]>
Don't calculate space based on the number of TRBs in the current segment, as it's OK to wrap to the start (and flip the cycle state bit). Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bell <[email protected]>
In anticipation of adjusting the number of utilised TRBs in a ring segment, add trbs_per_seg to struct xhci_ring and use this instead of a compile-time define. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bell <[email protected]>
The VL805 fetches up to 4 transfer TRBs at a time. TRB reads don't cross a 64B boundary, and if a TRB is fetched and is not on a 64B boundary, the read is sized up to the next 64B boundary. However the VL805 implements a readahead prefetch for TRBs on a transfer ring. This fetches the next 64B after any TRB read has happened. Near the end of a ring segment, the prefetcher can read the first 64B of the next page in physical memory and this is where the behaviour causes a bug. The controller does not tag reads with which endpoint they are for, so if the start of the next page is a ring segment used by a victim endpoint, and the victim endpoint is about to fetch TRBs from the start of the segment, the victim endpoint will read from the prefetched data and not perform a read to main memory. If the data is stale, the ring cycle state bit may not be correct and the endpoint will silently halt. Adjust trbs_per_seg for transfer rings allocated for this controller. See raspberrypi#4685 Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bell <[email protected]>
The driver supported using GPIOs to control the shutdown line, but no regulator control. Add regulator hooks. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
Not all implementations wire up the enable GPIO and may just tie it to a supply rail. Make it optional. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
bcm2835_isp_remove is called on an initialisation failure, but at that point the drvdata hasn't been set. This causes a crash when e.g. using the cutdown firmware (gpu_mem=16). Move platform_set_drvdata before the instance probing loop to avoid the problem. See: raspberrypi#4774 Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell <[email protected]>
raspberrypi#4440 Upstream has added additional device specific controls, so the V4L2_CID_USER_BASE + 0x10e0 value that had been defined for use with the ISP has been taken by something else (and +0x10f0 has been used as well) Duplicate the use on V4L2_CID_USER_BASE + 0x10e0 so that userspace (libcamera) doesn't need to change. Once the driver is upstream, then we'll update libcamera to adopt the new value as it then won't change. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
Use GitHubs issue form for bug reports. - modern look - user don't need to mess with given markdown parts while filling the issue template Setup config.yml for general questions and problems with the Raspbian distribution packages.
ISP device allocation is dynamic hence the locks too. struct mutex queue_lock is not initialized which result in bug. Fixing same by initializing it. [ 29.847138] INFO: trying to register non-static key. [ 29.847156] The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe [ 29.847159] you didn't initialize this object before use? [ 29.847161] turning off the locking correctness validator. [ 29.847167] CPU: 1 PID: 343 Comm: v4l_id Tainted: G C 5.15.11-rt24-v8+ raspberrypi#8 [ 29.847187] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.4 (DT) [ 29.847194] Call trace: [ 29.847197] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b8 [ 29.847227] show_stack+0x20/0x30 [ 29.847240] dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8 [ 29.847254] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ 29.847263] register_lock_class+0x494/0x4a0 [ 29.847278] __lock_acquire+0x80/0x1680 [ 29.847289] lock_acquire+0x214/0x3a0 [ 29.847300] mutex_lock_nested+0x70/0xc8 [ 29.847312] _vb2_fop_release+0x3c/0xa8 [videobuf2_v4l2] [ 29.847346] vb2_fop_release+0x34/0x60 [videobuf2_v4l2] [ 29.847367] v4l2_release+0xc8/0x108 [videodev] [ 29.847453] __fput+0x8c/0x258 [ 29.847476] ____fput+0x18/0x28 [ 29.847487] task_work_run+0x98/0x180 [ 29.847502] do_notify_resume+0x228/0x3f8 [ 29.847515] el0_svc+0xec/0xf0 [ 29.847523] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xb8 [ 29.847531] el0t_64_sync+0x180/0x184 Signed-off-by: Padmanabha Srinivasaiah <[email protected]>
The Raspbery Pi PoE+ HAT exposes a fan controller and power supply status reporting via a single I2C address. Create an MFD device that allows loading of the relevant sub-drivers, with a shared I2C regmap. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
The firmware can only use I2C0 if the kernel isn't, therefore with libcamera and DRM using it the PoE HAT fan control needs to move to the kernel. Add the option for the driver to be created by the PoE HAT core MFD driver, and use the I2C regmap that provides to control fan functions. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
As documented the _AVG parameters are meant to be hardware averaged, but the implementation for the PoE+ HAT was done in software in the firmware. Drop the property. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
The firmware can only use I2C0 if the kernel isn't, therefore with libcamera and DRM using it the PoE HAT fan control needs to move to the kernel. Add the option for the driver to be created by the PoE HAT core MFD driver, and use the I2C regmap that provides to control fan functions. Signed-off-by: Dave Stevenson <[email protected]>
On a Pi3 B/B+ platform the imx219 sensor frequently generates a single corrupt frame when the sensor first starts. This can either be a missing line, or invalid samples within the line. This only occurrs using the Unicam kernel driver. Disabling trigger mode elimiates this corruption. Since trigger mode is a legacy feature copied from the firmware driver and not expected to be needed, remove it. Tested on the Raspberry Pi cameras and shows no ill effects. Signed-off-by: Naushir Patuck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Penk Chen <[email protected]>
Clang warns:
drivers/media/platform/bcm2835/bcm2835-unicam.c:3109:6: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is true [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
if (!source_pads) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/media/platform/bcm2835/bcm2835-unicam.c:3152:9: note: uninitialized use occurs here
return ret;
^~~
drivers/media/platform/bcm2835/bcm2835-unicam.c:3109:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false
if (!source_pads) {
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/media/platform/bcm2835/bcm2835-unicam.c:3091:9: note: initialize the variable 'ret' to silence this warning
int ret;
^
= 0
1 warning generated.
When the if condition is true, ret will be used uninitialized, which
could result in undesirable behavior. Set ret to -ENODEV on the error
path, which is a standard error code for the ->complete() callback.
Fixes: d056e86 ("media/bcm2835-unicam: Parse pad numbers correctly")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
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…le_direct_reclaim() commit 6aaced5 upstream. The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 raspberrypi#5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 raspberrypi#6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 raspberrypi#7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 raspberrypi#8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 raspberrypi#9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [[email protected]: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 2d2d4f6 ] We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 9ab4981 ] If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says, it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the _early() suffix. Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging: xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01 xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged. ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G U W 6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3 Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022 RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe] This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a signature failure. There will still be an extra message, xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100 but that's better than a NULL ptr deref. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/3956 Fixes: c9474b7 ("drm/xe: Wedge the entire device") Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 5001ef3) Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 1b10a51 ] Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test. The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead to a deadlock. However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its parent lock are distinct ones. The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev). To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired. [1] raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock: [ 213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.620270] [ 213.620270] but task is already holding lock: [ 213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.622045] [ 213.622045] other info that might help us debug this: [ 213.622778] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 213.622778] [ 213.623465] CPU0 [ 213.623815] ---- [ 213.624148] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock); [ 213.624615] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock); [ 213.625071] [ 213.625071] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 213.625071] [ 213.625805] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 213.625805] [ 213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118: [ 213.627019] #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.628088] #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.629094] #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.630106] #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.631185] [ 213.631185] stack backtrace: [ 213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1 [ 213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 213.633785] Call Trace: [ 213.634099] [ 213.634393] dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0 [ 213.634806] print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0 [ 213.635265] __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40 [ 213.635712] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0 [ 213.636120] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.636722] ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.637277] __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0 [ 213.637697] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.638305] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.638902] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 213.639400] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.640016] mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.640615] set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.641144] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40 [ 213.641586] mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.642145] ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.642679] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.643426] ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80 [ 213.643878] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.644426] ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.645213] ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40 [ 213.645675] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0 [ 213.646101] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.646625] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0 [ 213.647102] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770 [ 213.647586] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.648102] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.648632] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0 [ 213.649060] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770 [ 213.649528] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 [ 213.649947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [ 213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b [ 213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX: 00007fa179b0737b [ 213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd2e6d487c [ 213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffd2e6d4f70 Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test") Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Jan 27, 2025
commit 9860370 upstream. irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking. This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 5.349336] ============================= [ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ raspberrypi#69 Tainted: G W [ 5.363031] ----------------------------- [ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock: [ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.385138] context-{5:5} [ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44: [ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204) [ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205) [ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006) [ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596) [ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614) [ 5.436472] stack backtrace: [ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ raspberrypi#69 [ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 5.461699] Call trace: [ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C [ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) [ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176) [ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814) [ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345) [ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250) [ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270) [ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807) [ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208) Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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Hou Tao says: ==================== The patch set continues the previous work [1] to move all the freeings of htab elements out of bucket lock. One motivation for the patch set is the locking problem reported by Sebastian [2]: the freeing of bpf_timer under PREEMPT_RT may acquire a spin-lock (namely softirq_expiry_lock). However the freeing procedure for htab element has already held a raw-spin-lock (namely bucket lock), and it will trigger the warning: "BUG: scheduling while atomic" as demonstrated by the selftests patch. Another motivation is to reduce the locked scope of bucket lock. However, the patch set doesn't move all freeing of htab element out of bucket lock, it still keep the free of special fields in pre-allocated hash map under the protect of bucket lock in htab_map_update_elem(). The patch set is structured as follows: * Patch #1 moves the element freeing out of bucket lock for htab_lru_map_delete_node(). However the freeing is still in the locked scope of LRU raw spin lock. * Patch #2~#3 move the element freeing out of bucket lock for __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() * Patch #4 cancels the bpf_timer in two steps to fix the locking problem in htab_map_update_elem() for PREEMPT_PRT. * Patch raspberrypi#5 adds a selftest for the locking problem Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. --- v3: * patch #1: update the commit message to state that the freeing of special field is still in the locked scope of LRU raw spin lock * patch #4: cancel the bpf_timer in two steps only for PREEMPT_RT (suggested by Alexei) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] * cancels the bpf timer in two steps instead of breaking the reuse the refill of per-cpu ->extra_elems into two steps v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:
$ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
#0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
#1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
#2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
#3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
#4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
raspberrypi#5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
raspberrypi#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
raspberrypi#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
raspberrypi#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
raspberrypi#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
raspberrypi#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
raspberrypi#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
raspberrypi#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)
0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1
Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
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This fixes the following hard lockup in isolate_lru_folios() during memory reclaim. If the LRU mostly contains ineligible folios this may trigger watchdog. watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 173 RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x255/0x2a0 Call Trace: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x31/0x40 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x5f/0x90 folio_batch_move_lru+0x91/0x150 lru_add_drain_per_cpu+0x1c/0x40 process_one_work+0x17d/0x350 worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0 kthread+0xe8/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 lruvec->lru_lock owner： PID: 2865 TASK: ffff888139214d40 CPU: 40 COMMAND: "kswapd0" #0 [fffffe0000945e60] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffffa567a555 #1 [fffffe0000945e68] nmi_handle at ffffffffa563b171 #2 [fffffe0000945eb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffffa6575920 #3 [fffffe0000945ed0] exc_nmi at ffffffffa6575af4 #4 [fffffe0000945ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffffa6601dde [exception RIP: isolate_lru_folios+403] RIP: ffffffffa597df53 RSP: ffffc90006fb7c28 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RCX: ffffea04a2196f88 RDX: ffffc90006fb7c60 RSI: ffffc90006fb7c60 RDI: ffffea04a2197048 RBP: ffff88812cbd3010 R8: ffffea04a2197008 R9: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffea04a2197008 R13: ffffea04a2197048 R14: ffffc90006fb7de8 R15: 0000000003e3e937 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 <NMI exception stack> raspberrypi#5 [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 raspberrypi#6 [ffffc90006fb7cf8] shrink_active_list at ffffffffa597f788 raspberrypi#7 [ffffc90006fb7da8] balance_pgdat at ffffffffa5986db0 raspberrypi#8 [ffffc90006fb7ec0] kswapd at ffffffffa5987354 raspberrypi#9 [ffffc90006fb7ef8] kthread at ffffffffa5748238 crash> Scenario: User processe are requesting a large amount of memory and keep page active. Then a module continuously requests memory from ZONE_DMA32 area. Memory reclaim will be triggered due to ZONE_DMA32 watermark alarm reached. However pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. Reproduce: Terminal 1: Construct to continuously increase pages active(anon). mkdir /tmp/memory mount -t tmpfs -o size=1024000M tmpfs /tmp/memory dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/memory/block bs=4M tail /tmp/memory/block Terminal 2: vmstat -a 1 active will increase. procs ---memory--- ---swap-- ---io---- -system-- ---cpu--- ... r b swpd free inact active si so bi bo 1 0 0 1445623076 45898836 83646008 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 43450228 86094616 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 41003480 88541364 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 38557088 90987756 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445623076 36109688 93435156 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619552 33663256 95881632 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 31217140 98327792 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 28769988 100774944 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 26322348 103222584 0 0 0 1 0 0 1445619804 23875592 105669340 0 0 0 cat /proc/meminfo | head Active(anon) increase. MemTotal: 1579941036 kB MemFree: 1445618500 kB MemAvailable: 1453013224 kB Buffers: 6516 kB Cached: 128653956 kB SwapCached: 0 kB Active: 118110812 kB Inactive: 11436620 kB Active(anon): 115345744 kB Inactive(anon): 945292 kB When the Active(anon) is 115345744 kB, insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. perf record -e vmscan:mm_vmscan_lru_isolate -aR perf script isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=2 nr_skipped=2 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844 nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=29 nr_skipped=29 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0 nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon See nr_scanned=28835844. 28835844 * 4k = 115343376KB approximately equal to 115345744 kB. If increase Active(anon) to 1000G then insmod module triggers the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. hard lockup will occur. In my device nr_scanned = 0000000003e3e937 when hard lockup. Convert to memory size 0x0000000003e3e937 * 4KB = 261072092 KB. [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53 ffffc90006fb7c30: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c40: ffffc90006fb7d40 ffff88812cbd3000 ffffc90006fb7c50: ffffc90006fb7d30 0000000106fb7de8 ffffc90006fb7c60: ffffea04a2197008 ffffea0006ed4a48 ffffc90006fb7c70: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7c90: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7ca0: 0000000000000000 0000000003e3e937 ffffc90006fb7cb0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffc90006fb7cc0: 8d7c0b56b7874b00 ffff88812cbd3000 About the Fixes: Why did it take eight years to be discovered? The problem requires the following conditions to occur: 1. The device memory should be large enough. 2. Pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area. 3. The memory in ZONE_DMA32 needs to reach the watermark. If the memory is not large enough, or if the usage design of ZONE_DMA32 area memory is reasonable, this problem is difficult to detect. notes: The problem is most likely to occur in ZONE_DMA32 and ZONE_NORMAL, but other suitable scenarios may also trigger the problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: b2e1875 ("mm, vmscan: begin reclaiming pages on a per-node basis") Signed-off-by: liuye <[email protected]> Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: Yang Shi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()). However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers"). So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search(). The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline] lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693 btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351 btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline] btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330 btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline] btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374 vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067 do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224 __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline] __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline] __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); rlock(btrfs-tree-01); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335: #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559 #1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183 #2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086 #3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659 #4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 raspberrypi#5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 raspberrypi#6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 raspberrypi#7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29 Code: ff ff c3 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29 RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88 </TASK> Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
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…nce changes [ Upstream commit e47f0a5 ] When starting/proceeding MCC, it will abort an ongoing hw scan process. In the proceeding cases, it unexpectedly tries to abort a non-exist hw scan process. Then, a trace shown at the bottom will happen. This problem is caused by a previous commit which changed some call sequence inside rtw89_hw_scan_complete() to fix some coex problems. These changes lead to our scanning flag was not cleared when proceeding MCC. To keep the fixes on coex, and resolve the problem here, re-consider the related call sequence. The known sequence requirements are listed below. * the old sequence: A. notify coex B. clear scanning flag C. proceed chanctx C-1. set channel C-2. proceed MCC (the problem: A needs to be after C-1) * the current sequence: C. proceed chanctx C-1. set channel C-2. proceed MCC A. notify coex B. clear scanning flag (the problem: C-2 needs to be after B) So, now let hw scan caller pass a callback to proceed chanctx if needed. Then, the new sequence will be like the below. C-1. set channel A. notify coex B. clear scanning flag C-2. proceed MCC The following is the kernel log for the problem in current sequence. rtw89_8852be 0000:04:00.0: rtw89_hw_scan_offload failed ret -110 ------------[ cut here ]------------ [...] CPU: 2 PID: 3991 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G OE 6.6.17 #3 Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB3WW (2.73 ) 11/28/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound wiphy_work_cancel [cfg80211] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] Code: 9c 24 d0 11 00 00 49 39 dd 0f 85 46 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 09 2d RSP: 0018:ffffb27783643d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff8a2280964bc0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8a23df580900 RBP: ffffb27783643d88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000400 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000008268 R12: ffff8a23df580900 R13: ffff8a23df581b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a258e680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f26a0654000 CR3: 000000002ea2e002 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x68/0x70 ? ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] ? __warn+0x8f/0x150 ? ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] ? report_bug+0x1f5/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] ieee80211_scan_work+0x14a/0x650 [mac80211] ? __queue_work+0x10f/0x410 wiphy_work_cancel+0x2fb/0x310 [cfg80211] process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x390 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 worker_thread+0x15b/0x2d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x108/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: f16c40a ("wifi: rtw89: Fix TX fail with A2DP after scanning") Signed-off-by: Zong-Zhe Yang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 600258d ] Packets handled by hardware have added secpath as a way to inform XFRM core code that this path was already handled. That secpath is not needed at all after policy is checked and it is removed later in the stack. However, in the case of IP forwarding is enabled (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward), that secpath is not removed and packets which already were handled are reentered to the driver TX path with xfrm_offload set. The following kernel panic is observed in mlx5 in such case: mlx5_core 0000:04:00.0 enp4s0f0np0: Link up mlx5_core 0000:04:00.1 enp4s0f1np1: Link up Initializing XFRM netlink socket IPsec XFRM device driver BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-alex #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? show_regs+0x63/0x70 ? __die_body+0x20/0x60 ? __die+0x2b/0x40 ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x550 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3ed/0x870 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 mlx5e_ipsec_handle_tx_skb+0xe7/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xmit+0x58e/0x1980 [mlx5_core] ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x82/0x1d0 sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x390 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d8/0xee0 ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0 ? internal_add_timer+0x48/0x70 ? mod_timer+0xe2/0x2b0 neigh_resolve_output+0x115/0x1b0 __neigh_update+0x26a/0xc50 neigh_update+0x14/0x20 arp_process+0x2cb/0x8e0 ? __napi_build_skb+0x5e/0x70 arp_rcv+0x11e/0x1c0 ? dev_gro_receive+0x574/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1cf/0x1f0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x183/0x2a0 napi_complete_done+0x76/0x1c0 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x234/0x7a0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x2d/0x1f0 net_rx_action+0x1a6/0x370 ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50 ? irq_int_handler+0x15/0x20 [mlx5_core] handle_softirqs+0xb9/0x2f0 ? handle_irq_event+0x44/0x60 irq_exit_rcu+0xdb/0x100 common_interrupt+0x98/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10 Code: 09 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 22 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 7f e9 36 00 fb 40 00 83 ff 07 77 21 89 ff ff 24 fd 88 3d a1 bd 0f 21 f8 RSP: 0018:ffffffffbe603de8 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000f92f46680 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000000518d4 RBP: ffffffffbe603df0 R08: 000000cd42e4dffb R09: ffffffffbe603d70 R10: 0000004d80d62680 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffbe60bf40 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffbe60aff8 ? default_idle+0x9/0x20 arch_cpu_idle+0x9/0x10 default_idle_call+0x29/0xf0 do_idle+0x1f2/0x240 cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30 rest_init+0xe7/0x100 start_kernel+0x76b/0xb90 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xc0/0x110 ? setup_ghcb+0xe/0x130 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 </TASK> Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 xfrm_user xfrm_algo binfmt_misc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm input_leds serio_raw qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx libcrc32c raid1 raid0 mlx5_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 ahci mlxfw i2c_i801 libahci i2c_mux i2c_smbus psample virtio_rng pci_hyperv_intf aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: 0x3b800000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: 5958372 ("xfrm: add RX datapath protection for IPsec packet offload mode") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Cassen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ] libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr", idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6 elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is found by UBsan. The error message: $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1 builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]' #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966 #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110 #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436 #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897 #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335 raspberrypi#5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502 raspberrypi#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351 raspberrypi#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404 raspberrypi#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448 raspberrypi#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556 raspberrypi#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 raspberrypi#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 raspberrypi#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6) 0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1 Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint") Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 1e8c193 ] This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order. - The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`, leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is held, it can create a circular dependency. By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue: [ 606.297333] ====================================================== [ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof raspberrypi#19 Tainted: G OE [ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.297413] but task is already holding lock: [ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.297725] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 606.297738] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 606.297749] -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.298929] -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.299236] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.300416] other info that might help us debug this: [ 606.300428] Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex [ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1 [ 606.300476] ---- ---- [ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex); [ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)); [ 606.300536] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825: [ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610 [ 606.301083] stack backtrace: [ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof raspberrypi#19 [ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024 [ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 606.301140] Call Trace: [ 606.301146] <TASK> [ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340 [ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490 [ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched] [ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.303512] </TASK> v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex) - Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing `enforce_isolation_mutex`. - This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock. - The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward. - This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order. Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization") Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Since commit 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API") there is the following ABBA deadlock (simplified) between the LED trigger code and the power-supply code: 1) When registering a power-supply class device, power_supply_register() calls led_trigger_register() from power_supply_create_triggers() in a scoped_guard(rwsem_read, &psy->extensions_sem) context. led_trigger_register() then in turn takes a LED subsystem lock. So here we have the following locking order: * Read-lock extensions_sem * Lock LED subsystem lock(s) 2) When registering a LED class device, with its default trigger set to a power-supply LED trigger (which has already been registered) The LED class code calls power_supply_led_trigger_activate() when setting up the default trigger. power_supply_led_trigger_activate() calls power_supply_get_property() to determine the initial value of to assign to the LED and that read-locks extensions_sem. So now we have the following locking order: * Lock LED subsystem lock(s) * Read-lock extensions_sem Fixing this is easy, there is no need to hold the extensions_sem when calling power_supply_create_triggers() since all triggers are always created rather then checking for the presence of certain attributes as power_supply_add_hwmon_sysfs() does. Move power_supply_create_triggers() out of the guard block to fix this. Here is the lockdep report fixed by this change: [ 31.249343] ====================================================== [ 31.249378] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 31.249413] 6.13.0-rc6+ raspberrypi#251 Tainted: G C E [ 31.249440] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 31.249471] (udev-worker)/553 is trying to acquire lock: [ 31.249501] ffff892adbcaf660 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150 [ 31.249574] but task is already holding lock: [ 31.249603] ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0 [ 31.249657] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 31.249696] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 31.249735] -> #2 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 31.249778] down_write+0x3b/0xd0 [ 31.249803] led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0 [ 31.249833] led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0 [ 31.249863] input_leds_connect+0x1dc/0x2a0 [ 31.249889] input_attach_handler.isra.0+0x75/0x90 [ 31.249921] input_register_device.cold+0xa1/0x150 [ 31.249955] hidinput_connect+0x8a2/0xb80 [ 31.249982] hid_connect+0x582/0x5c0 [ 31.250007] hid_hw_start+0x3f/0x60 [ 31.250030] hid_device_probe+0x122/0x1f0 [ 31.250053] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.250080] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.250105] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.250132] __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 [ 31.250160] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0 [ 31.250184] __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0 [ 31.250207] bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0 [ 31.250230] device_add+0x64a/0x860 [ 31.250252] hid_add_device+0xe5/0x240 [ 31.250279] usbhid_probe+0x4dc/0x620 [ 31.250303] usb_probe_interface+0xe4/0x2a0 [ 31.250329] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.250353] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.250377] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.250404] __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 [ 31.250431] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0 [ 31.250455] __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0 [ 31.250478] bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0 [ 31.250501] device_add+0x64a/0x860 [ 31.250523] usb_set_configuration+0x606/0x8a0 [ 31.250552] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x3e/0x60 [ 31.250579] usb_probe_device+0x3d/0x120 [ 31.250605] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.250629] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.250653] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.250680] __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 [ 31.250707] bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0 [ 31.250731] __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0 [ 31.250753] bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0 [ 31.250776] device_add+0x64a/0x860 [ 31.250798] usb_new_device.cold+0x141/0x38f [ 31.250828] hub_event+0x1166/0x1980 [ 31.250854] process_one_work+0x20f/0x580 [ 31.250879] worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0 [ 31.250904] kthread+0xee/0x120 [ 31.250926] ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 [ 31.250954] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 31.250982] -> #1 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 31.251022] down_write+0x3b/0xd0 [ 31.251045] led_trigger_register+0x40/0x1b0 [ 31.251074] power_supply_register_led_trigger+0x88/0x150 [ 31.251107] power_supply_create_triggers+0x55/0xe0 [ 31.251135] __power_supply_register.part.0+0x34e/0x4a0 [ 31.251164] devm_power_supply_register+0x70/0xc0 [ 31.251190] bq27xxx_battery_setup+0x1a1/0x6d0 [bq27xxx_battery] [ 31.251235] bq27xxx_battery_i2c_probe+0xe5/0x17f [bq27xxx_battery_i2c] [ 31.251272] i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0 [ 31.251299] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.251324] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.251348] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.251375] __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 [ 31.251398] bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0 [ 31.251421] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0 [ 31.251445] driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 [ 31.251470] i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0 [ 31.251498] do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0 [ 31.251522] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [ 31.251550] __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190 [ 31.251575] do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 [ 31.251598] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 31.251629] -> #0 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}: [ 31.251668] __lock_acquire+0x13ce/0x21c0 [ 31.251694] lock_acquire+0xcf/0x2e0 [ 31.251719] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 31.251741] power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150 [ 31.251774] power_supply_update_leds+0x8d/0x230 [ 31.251804] power_supply_led_trigger_activate+0x18/0x20 [ 31.251837] led_trigger_set+0x1fc/0x300 [ 31.251863] led_trigger_set_default+0x90/0xe0 [ 31.251892] led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0 [ 31.251921] devm_led_classdev_multicolor_register_ext+0x6e/0xb80 [led_class_multicolor] [ 31.251969] ktd202x_probe+0x464/0x5c0 [leds_ktd202x] [ 31.252002] i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0 [ 31.252027] really_probe+0xde/0x340 [ 31.252052] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 31.252076] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 31.252103] __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0 [ 31.252125] bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0 [ 31.252148] bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0 [ 31.252172] driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 [ 31.252197] i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0 [ 31.252225] do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0 [ 31.252248] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [ 31.252274] __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190 [ 31.253986] do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 [ 31.255826] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 31.257614] other info that might help us debug this: [ 31.257619] Chain exists of: &psy->extensions_sem --> triggers_list_lock --> &led_cdev->trigger_lock [ 31.257630] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 31.257632] CPU0 CPU1 [ 31.257633] ---- ---- [ 31.257634] lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock); [ 31.257637] lock(triggers_list_lock); [ 31.257640] lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock); [ 31.257643] rlock(&psy->extensions_sem); [ 31.257646] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 31.289433] 4 locks held by (udev-worker)/553: [ 31.289443] #0: ffff892ad9658108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0xaf/0x1c0 [ 31.289463] #1: ffff892adbc0bbc8 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_classdev_register_ext+0x1c7/0x3a0 [ 31.289476] #2: ffffffffad0e30b0 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x2c/0xe0 [ 31.289487] #3: ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0 Fixes: 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API") Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> Cc: Armin Wolf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>
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…rary mm Erhard reports the following KASAN hit on Talos II (power9) with kernel 6.13: [ 12.028126] ================================================================== [ 12.028198] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 12.028260] Write of size 8 at addr 0000187e458f2000 by task systemd/1 [ 12.028346] CPU: 87 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.13.0-P9-dirty #3 [ 12.028408] Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT [ 12.028446] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV [ 12.028500] Call Trace: [ 12.028536] [c000000008dbf3b0] [c000000001656a48] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x110 (unreliable) [ 12.028609] [c000000008dbf3f0] [c0000000006e2fc8] print_report+0x6b0/0x708 [ 12.028666] [c000000008dbf4e0] [c0000000006e2454] kasan_report+0x164/0x300 [ 12.028725] [c000000008dbf600] [c0000000006e54d4] kasan_check_range+0x314/0x370 [ 12.028784] [c000000008dbf640] [c0000000006e6310] __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x40 [ 12.028842] [c000000008dbf660] [c000000000578e8c] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 12.028902] [c000000008dbf6a0] [c0000000000acfe4] __patch_instructions+0x194/0x210 [ 12.028965] [c000000008dbf6e0] [c0000000000ade80] patch_instructions+0x150/0x590 [ 12.029026] [c000000008dbf7c0] [c0000000001159bc] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x6c/0xe0 [ 12.029085] [c000000008dbf800] [c000000000424250] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x40/0xc0 [ 12.029147] [c000000008dbf830] [c000000000115dec] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3bc/0x930 [ 12.029206] [c000000008dbf990] [c000000000423720] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x1f0/0x280 [ 12.029266] [c000000008dbfa00] [c000000000434b18] bpf_prog_load+0xbb8/0x1370 [ 12.029324] [c000000008dbfb70] [c000000000436ebc] __sys_bpf+0x5ac/0x2e00 [ 12.029379] [c000000008dbfd00] [c00000000043a228] sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 [ 12.029435] [c000000008dbfd20] [c000000000038eb4] system_call_exception+0x334/0x610 [ 12.029497] [c000000008dbfe50] [c00000000000c270] system_call_vectored_common+0xf0/0x280 [ 12.029561] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.029608] NIP: 00003fff82f5cfa8 LR: 00003fff82f5cfa8 CTR: 0000000000000000 [ 12.029660] REGS: c000000008dbfe80 TRAP: 3000 Tainted: G T (6.13.0-P9-dirty) [ 12.029735] MSR: 900000000280f032 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42004848 XER: 00000000 [ 12.029855] IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000169 00003fffdcf789a0 00003fff83067100 0000000000000005 GPR04: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000090 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000000000 00003fff836ff7e0 c000000000010678 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f28 00003fffdcf78f90 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f80 GPR24: 00003fffdcf78f70 00003fffdcf78d10 00003fff835c7239 00003fffdcf78bd8 GPR28: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000011f547580 [ 12.030316] NIP [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.030361] LR [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.030405] --- interrupt: 3000 [ 12.030444] ================================================================== Commit c28c15b ("powerpc/code-patching: Use temporary mm for Radix MMU") is inspired from x86 but unlike x86 is doesn't disable KASAN reports during patching. This wasn't a problem at the begining because __patch_mem() is not instrumented. Commit 465cabc ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce patch_instructions()") use copy_to_kernel_nofault() to copy several instructions at once. But when using temporary mm the destination is not regular kernel memory but a kind of kernel-like memory located in user address space. Because it is not in kernel address space it is not covered by KASAN shadow memory. Since commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault") KASAN reports bad accesses from copy_to_kernel_nofault(). Here a bad access to user memory is reported because KASAN detects the lack of shadow memory and the address is below TASK_SIZE. Do like x86 in commit b3fd8e8 ("x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text poking") and disable KASAN reports during patching when using temporary mm. Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <[email protected]> Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250201151435.48400261@yea/ Fixes: 465cabc ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce patch_instructions()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1c05b2a1b02ad75b981cfc45927e0b4a90441046.1738577687.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
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We have several places across the kernel where we want to access another
task's syscall arguments, such as ptrace(2), seccomp(2), etc., by making
a call to syscall_get_arguments().
This works for register arguments right away by accessing the task's
`regs' member of `struct pt_regs', however for stack arguments seen with
32-bit/o32 kernels things are more complicated. Technically they ought
to be obtained from the user stack with calls to an access_remote_vm(),
but we have an easier way available already.
So as to be able to access syscall stack arguments as regular function
arguments following the MIPS calling convention we copy them over from
the user stack to the kernel stack in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S, in
handle_sys(), to the current stack frame's outgoing argument space at
the top of the stack, which is where the handler called expects to see
its incoming arguments. This area is also pointed at by the `pt_regs'
pointer obtained by task_pt_regs().
Make the o32 stack argument space a proper member of `struct pt_regs'
then, by renaming the existing member from `pad0' to `args' and using
generated offsets to access the space. No functional change though.
With the change in place the o32 kernel stack frame layout at the entry
to a syscall handler invoked by handle_sys() is therefore as follows:
$sp + 68 -> | ... | <- pt_regs.regs[9]
+---------------------+
$sp + 64 -> | $t0 | <- pt_regs.regs[8]
+---------------------+
$sp + 60 -> | $a3/argument #4 | <- pt_regs.regs[7]
+---------------------+
$sp + 56 -> | $a2/argument #3 | <- pt_regs.regs[6]
+---------------------+
$sp + 52 -> | $a1/argument #2 | <- pt_regs.regs[5]
+---------------------+
$sp + 48 -> | $a0/argument #1 | <- pt_regs.regs[4]
+---------------------+
$sp + 44 -> | $v1 | <- pt_regs.regs[3]
+---------------------+
$sp + 40 -> | $v0 | <- pt_regs.regs[2]
+---------------------+
$sp + 36 -> | $at | <- pt_regs.regs[1]
+---------------------+
$sp + 32 -> | $zero | <- pt_regs.regs[0]
+---------------------+
$sp + 28 -> | stack argument raspberrypi#8 | <- pt_regs.args[7]
+---------------------+
$sp + 24 -> | stack argument raspberrypi#7 | <- pt_regs.args[6]
+---------------------+
$sp + 20 -> | stack argument raspberrypi#6 | <- pt_regs.args[5]
+---------------------+
$sp + 16 -> | stack argument raspberrypi#5 | <- pt_regs.args[4]
+---------------------+
$sp + 12 -> | psABI space for $a3 | <- pt_regs.args[3]
+---------------------+
$sp + 8 -> | psABI space for $a2 | <- pt_regs.args[2]
+---------------------+
$sp + 4 -> | psABI space for $a1 | <- pt_regs.args[1]
+---------------------+
$sp + 0 -> | psABI space for $a0 | <- pt_regs.args[0]
+---------------------+
holding user data received and with the first 4 frame slots reserved by
the psABI for the compiler to spill the incoming arguments from $a0-$a3
registers (which it sometimes does according to its needs) and the next
4 frame slots designated by the psABI for any stack function arguments
that follow. This data is also available for other tasks to peek/poke
at as reqired and where permitted.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <[email protected]>
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commit 9860370 upstream. irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking. This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 5.349336] ============================= [ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ raspberrypi#69 Tainted: G W [ 5.363031] ----------------------------- [ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock: [ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.385138] context-{5:5} [ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44: [ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204) [ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205) [ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006) [ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596) [ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614) [ 5.436472] stack backtrace: [ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ raspberrypi#69 [ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 5.461699] Call trace: [ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C [ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) [ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176) [ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814) [ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345) [ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250) [ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270) [ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807) [ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208) Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 600258d ] Packets handled by hardware have added secpath as a way to inform XFRM core code that this path was already handled. That secpath is not needed at all after policy is checked and it is removed later in the stack. However, in the case of IP forwarding is enabled (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward), that secpath is not removed and packets which already were handled are reentered to the driver TX path with xfrm_offload set. The following kernel panic is observed in mlx5 in such case: mlx5_core 0000:04:00.0 enp4s0f0np0: Link up mlx5_core 0000:04:00.1 enp4s0f1np1: Link up Initializing XFRM netlink socket IPsec XFRM device driver BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-alex #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? show_regs+0x63/0x70 ? __die_body+0x20/0x60 ? __die+0x2b/0x40 ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x550 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3ed/0x870 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 mlx5e_ipsec_handle_tx_skb+0xe7/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xmit+0x58e/0x1980 [mlx5_core] ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x82/0x1d0 sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x390 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d8/0xee0 ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0 ? internal_add_timer+0x48/0x70 ? mod_timer+0xe2/0x2b0 neigh_resolve_output+0x115/0x1b0 __neigh_update+0x26a/0xc50 neigh_update+0x14/0x20 arp_process+0x2cb/0x8e0 ? __napi_build_skb+0x5e/0x70 arp_rcv+0x11e/0x1c0 ? dev_gro_receive+0x574/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1cf/0x1f0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x183/0x2a0 napi_complete_done+0x76/0x1c0 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x234/0x7a0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x2d/0x1f0 net_rx_action+0x1a6/0x370 ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50 ? irq_int_handler+0x15/0x20 [mlx5_core] handle_softirqs+0xb9/0x2f0 ? handle_irq_event+0x44/0x60 irq_exit_rcu+0xdb/0x100 common_interrupt+0x98/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10 Code: 09 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 22 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 7f e9 36 00 fb 40 00 83 ff 07 77 21 89 ff ff 24 fd 88 3d a1 bd 0f 21 f8 RSP: 0018:ffffffffbe603de8 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000f92f46680 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000000518d4 RBP: ffffffffbe603df0 R08: 000000cd42e4dffb R09: ffffffffbe603d70 R10: 0000004d80d62680 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffbe60bf40 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffbe60aff8 ? default_idle+0x9/0x20 arch_cpu_idle+0x9/0x10 default_idle_call+0x29/0xf0 do_idle+0x1f2/0x240 cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30 rest_init+0xe7/0x100 start_kernel+0x76b/0xb90 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xc0/0x110 ? setup_ghcb+0xe/0x130 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 </TASK> Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 xfrm_user xfrm_algo binfmt_misc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm input_leds serio_raw qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx libcrc32c raid1 raid0 mlx5_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 ahci mlxfw i2c_i801 libahci i2c_mux i2c_smbus psample virtio_rng pci_hyperv_intf aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: 0x3b800000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: 5958372 ("xfrm: add RX datapath protection for IPsec packet offload mode") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Cassen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ] libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr", idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6 elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is found by UBsan. The error message: $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1 builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]' #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966 #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110 #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436 #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897 #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335 raspberrypi#5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502 raspberrypi#6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351 raspberrypi#7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404 raspberrypi#8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448 raspberrypi#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556 raspberrypi#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 raspberrypi#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 raspberrypi#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6) 0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1 Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint") Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…rary mm [ Upstream commit dc9c516 ] Erhard reports the following KASAN hit on Talos II (power9) with kernel 6.13: [ 12.028126] ================================================================== [ 12.028198] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 12.028260] Write of size 8 at addr 0000187e458f2000 by task systemd/1 [ 12.028346] CPU: 87 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.13.0-P9-dirty #3 [ 12.028408] Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT [ 12.028446] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV [ 12.028500] Call Trace: [ 12.028536] [c000000008dbf3b0] [c000000001656a48] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x110 (unreliable) [ 12.028609] [c000000008dbf3f0] [c0000000006e2fc8] print_report+0x6b0/0x708 [ 12.028666] [c000000008dbf4e0] [c0000000006e2454] kasan_report+0x164/0x300 [ 12.028725] [c000000008dbf600] [c0000000006e54d4] kasan_check_range+0x314/0x370 [ 12.028784] [c000000008dbf640] [c0000000006e6310] __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x40 [ 12.028842] [c000000008dbf660] [c000000000578e8c] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 12.028902] [c000000008dbf6a0] [c0000000000acfe4] __patch_instructions+0x194/0x210 [ 12.028965] [c000000008dbf6e0] [c0000000000ade80] patch_instructions+0x150/0x590 [ 12.029026] [c000000008dbf7c0] [c0000000001159bc] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x6c/0xe0 [ 12.029085] [c000000008dbf800] [c000000000424250] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x40/0xc0 [ 12.029147] [c000000008dbf830] [c000000000115dec] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3bc/0x930 [ 12.029206] [c000000008dbf990] [c000000000423720] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x1f0/0x280 [ 12.029266] [c000000008dbfa00] [c000000000434b18] bpf_prog_load+0xbb8/0x1370 [ 12.029324] [c000000008dbfb70] [c000000000436ebc] __sys_bpf+0x5ac/0x2e00 [ 12.029379] [c000000008dbfd00] [c00000000043a228] sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 [ 12.029435] [c000000008dbfd20] [c000000000038eb4] system_call_exception+0x334/0x610 [ 12.029497] [c000000008dbfe50] [c00000000000c270] system_call_vectored_common+0xf0/0x280 [ 12.029561] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.029608] NIP: 00003fff82f5cfa8 LR: 00003fff82f5cfa8 CTR: 0000000000000000 [ 12.029660] REGS: c000000008dbfe80 TRAP: 3000 Tainted: G T (6.13.0-P9-dirty) [ 12.029735] MSR: 900000000280f032 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42004848 XER: 00000000 [ 12.029855] IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000169 00003fffdcf789a0 00003fff83067100 0000000000000005 GPR04: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000090 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000000000 00003fff836ff7e0 c000000000010678 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f28 00003fffdcf78f90 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f80 GPR24: 00003fffdcf78f70 00003fffdcf78d10 00003fff835c7239 00003fffdcf78bd8 GPR28: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000011f547580 [ 12.030316] NIP [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.030361] LR [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.030405] --- interrupt: 3000 [ 12.030444] ================================================================== Commit c28c15b ("powerpc/code-patching: Use temporary mm for Radix MMU") is inspired from x86 but unlike x86 is doesn't disable KASAN reports during patching. This wasn't a problem at the begining because __patch_mem() is not instrumented. Commit 465cabc ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce patch_instructions()") use copy_to_kernel_nofault() to copy several instructions at once. But when using temporary mm the destination is not regular kernel memory but a kind of kernel-like memory located in user address space. Because it is not in kernel address space it is not covered by KASAN shadow memory. Since commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault") KASAN reports bad accesses from copy_to_kernel_nofault(). Here a bad access to user memory is reported because KASAN detects the lack of shadow memory and the address is below TASK_SIZE. Do like x86 in commit b3fd8e8 ("x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text poking") and disable KASAN reports during patching when using temporary mm. Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <[email protected]> Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250201151435.48400261@yea/ Fixes: 465cabc ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce patch_instructions()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1c05b2a1b02ad75b981cfc45927e0b4a90441046.1738577687.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit f02c41f upstream. Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access. [ 4.239592] ============================= [ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f raspberrypi#35 Not tainted [ 4.239603] ----------------------------- [ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock: [ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this: [ 4.239643] context-{5:5} [ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76: [ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c [ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c [ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8 [ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value. [ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc [ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690 [ 4.264840] #4: [ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690 [ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee100000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz [ 4.304082] stack backtrace: [ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f raspberrypi#35 [ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) [ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 4.304106] Call trace: [ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C) [ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90 [ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584 [ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c [ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 [ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8 [ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178 [ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690 [ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190 [ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4 [ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries [ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0 [ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac [ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4 [ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440 [ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4 [ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78 [ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8 [ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8 [ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118 [ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160 [ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 [ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc [ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8 [ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c [ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 9f7b2aa ] When mb-xdp is set and return is XDP_PASS, packet is converted from xdp_buff to sk_buff with xdp_update_skb_shared_info() in bnxt_xdp_build_skb(). bnxt_xdp_build_skb() passes incorrect truesize argument to xdp_update_skb_shared_info(). The truesize is calculated as BNXT_RX_PAGE_SIZE * sinfo->nr_frags but the skb_shared_info was wiped by napi_build_skb() before. So it stores sinfo->nr_frags before bnxt_xdp_build_skb() and use it instead of getting skb_shared_info from xdp_get_shared_info_from_buff(). Splat looks like: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/core/skbuff.c:6072 skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_tcpudp veth af_packet xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink xfrm_user xt_addrtype nft_coms CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #3 RIP: 0010:skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 Code: 4b fd ff ff 49 8b 34 24 40 80 e6 40 0f 84 3d fd ff ff 49 8b 74 24 48 40 f6 c6 01 0f 84 2e fd ff ff 48 8d 4e ff e9 25 fd ff ff <0f> 0b e99 RSP: 0018:ffffb62c4120caa8 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffffb62c4120cb14 RCX: 0000000000000ec0 RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffa06e5d7dc000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffffa06e5d7ddec0 R08: ffffa06e6120a800 R09: ffffa06e7a119900 R10: 0000000000002310 R11: ffffa06e5d7dcec0 R12: ffffe4360575f740 R13: ffffe43600000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000002 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0755f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f147b76b0f8 CR3: 00000001615d4000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __warn+0x84/0x130 ? skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 ? report_bug+0x18a/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 inet_frag_reasm_finish+0x11f/0x2e0 ip_defrag+0x37a/0x900 ip_local_deliver+0x51/0x120 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x64/0x70 ip_sublist_rcv+0x179/0x210 ip_list_rcv+0xf9/0x130 How to reproduce: <Node A> ip link set $interface1 xdp obj xdp_pass.o ip link set $interface1 mtu 9000 up ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev $interface1 <Node B> ip link set $interfac2 mtu 9000 up ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev $interface2 ping 10.0.0.1 -s 65000 Following ping.py patch adds xdp-mb-pass case. so ping.py is going to be able to reproduce this issue. Fixes: 1dc4c55 ("bnxt: adding bnxt_xdp_build_skb to build skb from multibuffer xdp_buff") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…ate_pagetables' [ Upstream commit fddc450 ] This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction operation, which could lead to deadlocks. Fixes the below: [ 223.418794] ====================================================== [ 223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 raspberrypi#14 Tainted: G U OE [ 223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock: [ 223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.419302] but task is already holding lock: [ 223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25 [ 223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing [ 223.419599] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 223.419611] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 223.419621] -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.419636] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.419647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.419656] svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.419954] svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu] [ 223.420236] svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.420503] kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.420763] kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421024] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 [ 223.421036] x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0 [ 223.421047] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.421056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.421068] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.421084] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560 [ 223.421095] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [ 223.421103] amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421361] add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu] [ 223.421623] unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 223.421888] kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 223.422148] amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.422414] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu] [ 223.422662] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 223.422673] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 223.422682] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 223.422690] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 223.422699] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 223.422708] -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.422723] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.422734] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.422742] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.422751] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.422760] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.423025] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.423285] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.423540] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.423807] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.423819] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.423829] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.423839] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.423847] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.423856] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.423864] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.423872] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.423880] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.423891] other info that might help us debug this: [ 223.423903] Chain exists of: &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock [ 223.423926] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 223.423935] CPU0 CPU1 [ 223.423942] ---- ---- [ 223.423949] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423958] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 223.423970] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423981] lock(&dqm->lock_hidden); [ 223.423990] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939: [ 223.424006] #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0 [ 223.424026] #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0 [ 223.424046] #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0 [ 223.424066] #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0 [ 223.424088] #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.424365] stack backtrace: [ 223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 raspberrypi#14 [ 223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022 [ 223.424416] Call Trace: [ 223.424423] <TASK> [ 223.424430] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 223.424441] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 223.424449] print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350 [ 223.424460] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 223.424469] ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 223.424481] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.424490] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.424505] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.424514] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.424783] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.424792] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425067] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 223.425076] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425339] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425350] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425358] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425367] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425631] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.425893] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.426156] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.426423] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426436] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.426450] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.426461] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426474] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426484] ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.426494] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426502] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426510] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426519] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426528] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426537] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426550] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.426569] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.426577] ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00 [ 223.426586] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426594] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426602] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426610] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426619] ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0 [ 223.426629] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.426643] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.426652] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.426661] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.426671] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426679] ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50 [ 223.426690] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426698] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426709] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426717] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426727] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426736] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426748] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426756] ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0 [ 223.426765] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426775] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426783] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426792] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426800] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426810] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426818] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426826] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426836] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426844] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426853] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426861] ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90 [ 223.426869] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426877] ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0 [ 223.426888] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57 [ 223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 [ 223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 [ 223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57 [ 223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011 [ 223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410 [ 223.427004] </TASK> v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer (`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the `pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix) v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler in commit message. (Lijo) Fixes: 438b39a ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd") Cc: Jesse Zhang <[email protected]> Cc: Yunxiang Li <[email protected]> Cc: Philip Yang <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Sierra <[email protected]> Cc: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…cal section [ Upstream commit 85b2b9c ] A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 053f3ff ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty raspberrypi#8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 52323ed ] syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below). The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor" conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock. To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and return -EBUSY when it fails. Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user space. syzbot report: syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline] ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline] rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline] ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015 ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558 init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910 do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257 do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline] do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline] do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline] kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568 kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline] wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64 notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85 notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524 blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:344 [inline] blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xa9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333 pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102 snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77 misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179 chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414 do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086 do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline] path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989 do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016 do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730 lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56 hibernate_compressor_param_set+0x1c/0x210 kernel/power/hibernate.c:1452 param_attr_store+0x18f/0x300 kernel/params.c:588 module_attr_store+0x55/0x80 kernel/params.c:924 sysfs_kf_write+0x117/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:139 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x33d/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline] vfs_write+0x5ae/0x1150 fs/read_write.c:679 ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:731 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: system_transition_mutex --> rtnl_mutex --> param_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(param_lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(param_lock); lock(system_transition_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ace60642828c074eb913 Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [ rjw: New subject matching the code changes, changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit b61e69b ] syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1] When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4, which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the mounted loop device to be invalidated. When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(), read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately causes a deadlock when entering diFree(). To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode. [1] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 but task is already holding lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309: #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline] #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026 #2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline] validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline] duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline] diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline] __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline] __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Apr 29, 2025
commit 93ae6e6 upstream. We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> raspberrypi#6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> raspberrypi#5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x43/0x1d0 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870 cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0 apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110 x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40 start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0 start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220 iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0 probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50 bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810 lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock --> &device->physical_node_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(dmar_global_lock); lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(iommu_probe_device_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic addition and removal of remapping units at runtime. Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list: - Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit. - Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list to apply configuration changes. The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for device registration. Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…cesses commit ef01cac upstream. Acquire a lock on kvm->srcu when userspace is getting MP state to handle a rather extreme edge case where "accepting" APIC events, i.e. processing pending INIT or SIPI, can trigger accesses to guest memory. If the vCPU is in L2 with INIT *and* a TRIPLE_FAULT request pending, then getting MP state will trigger a nested VM-Exit by way of ->check_nested_events(), and emuating the nested VM-Exit can access guest memory. The splat was originally hit by syzkaller on a Google-internal kernel, and reproduced on an upstream kernel by hacking the triple_fault_event_test selftest to stuff a pending INIT, store an MSR on VM-Exit (to generate a memory access on VMX), and do vcpu_mp_state_get() to trigger the scenario. ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx/pi_lockdep_false_pos-lock #3 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/linux/kvm_host.h:1058 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by triple_fault_ev/1256: #0: ffff88810df5a330 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x9a0 [kvm] stack backtrace: CPU: 11 UID: 1000 PID: 1256 Comm: triple_fault_ev Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x144/0x190 kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x156/0x180 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm] read_and_check_msr_entry+0x2e/0x180 [kvm_intel] __nested_vmx_vmexit+0x550/0xde0 [kvm_intel] kvm_check_nested_events+0x1b/0x30 [kvm] kvm_apic_accept_events+0x33/0x100 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate+0x30/0x1d0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x33e/0x9a0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8b/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Message-ID: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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May 7, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1b04495 ] Syzkaller reports a bug as follows: Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x18b00e at process virtual address 0x20ffd000 Memory failure: 0x18b00e: dirty swapcache page still referenced by 2 users Memory failure: 0x18b00e: recovery action for dirty swapcache page: Failed page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x20ffd pfn:0x18b00e memcg:ffff0000dd6d9000 anon flags: 0x5ffffe00482011(locked|dirty|arch_1|swapbacked|hwpoison|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff) raw: 005ffffe00482011 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff0000e232a7c9 raw: 0000000000020ffd 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff ffff0000dd6d9000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_uptodate(folio)) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/swap_state.c:184! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.6.0-gcb097e7de84e #3 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158 lr : add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158 sp : ffff800087f37340 x29: ffff800087f37340 x28: fffffc00052c0380 x27: ffff800087f37780 x26: ffff800087f37490 x25: ffff800087f37c78 x24: ffff800087f377a0 x23: ffff800087f37c50 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: fffffc00052c03b4 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: fffffc00052c0380 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 296f696c6f662865 x16: 7461646f7470755f x15: 747365745f6f696c x14: 6f6621284f494c4f x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff600036d8b97b x11: 1fffe00036d8b97a x10: ffff600036d8b97a x9 : dfff800000000000 x8 : 00009fffc9274686 x7 : ffff0001b6c5cbd3 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff0000c25896c0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000c25896c0 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: add_to_swap+0xbc/0x158 shrink_folio_list+0x12ac/0x2648 shrink_inactive_list+0x318/0x948 shrink_lruvec+0x450/0x720 shrink_node_memcgs+0x280/0x4a8 shrink_node+0x128/0x978 balance_pgdat+0x4f0/0xb20 kswapd+0x228/0x438 kthread+0x214/0x230 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 I can reproduce this issue with the following steps: 1) When a dirty swapcache page is isolated by reclaim process and the page isn't locked, inject memory failure for the page. me_swapcache_dirty() clears uptodate flag and tries to delete from lru, but fails. Reclaim process will put the hwpoisoned page back to lru. 2) The process that maps the hwpoisoned page exits, the page is deleted the page will never be freed and will be in the lru forever. 3) If we trigger a reclaim again and tries to reclaim the page, add_to_swap() will trigger VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO due to the uptodate flag is cleared. To fix it, skip the hwpoisoned page in shrink_folio_list(). Besides, the hwpoison folio may not be unmapped by hwpoison_user_mappings() yet, unmap it in shrink_folio_list(), otherwise the folio will fail to be unmaped by hwpoison_user_mappings() since the folio isn't in lru list. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]> Cc: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Cc: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]> Cc: Nanyong Sun <[email protected]> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]> Cc: <stable@vger,kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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