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Mithril snapshots for Cardano database could be compromised by an adversary

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 7, 2025 in input-output-hk/mithril • Updated May 7, 2025

Package

cargo mithril-client (Rust)

Affected versions

< 0.12.2

Patched versions

0.12.2

Description

Impact

Mithril certification of Cardano database

The Mithril network provides certification for snapshots of the Cardano database, enabling users to quickly bootstrap a Cardano node without relying on the slower peer-to-peer synchronization process.

To generate a multi-signature, a minimum threshold of Cardano stake registered in the protocol must agree on signing the same message. In this context, a digest is computed from the internal files of the Cardano node's database. However, this mechanism has certain limitations. Specifically, some files are not identically generated across all Cardano nodes, and there is no API to provide consistent snapshots at a specific beacon on the Cardano chain:

  • All immutable files, except the last one (which is still being created), are used to compute the message
  • The last immutable file is excluded from the signature
  • The ledger state files are also excluded from the signature.

Cardano node startup sequence

A Cardano node can only perform a fast bootstrap if a pre-computed ledger state is loaded into its database; otherwise, a full re-computation is required, which is time-consuming. During the startup phase with a pre-computed ledger state, the node performs structural verification of the ledger state and lightweight conformity checks which may not be enough to systematically detect invalid ledger state.

Attack scenarios

Inconsistencies could be introduced into a tampered ledger state distributed through Mithril snapshots, either by an unknown source or by a compromised IOG-operated aggregator. These inconsistencies would not be immediately detected by Cardano nodes started with such snapshots, potentially enabling long-range attacks that might not be corrected by honest nodes, even if they sync from genesis.

Currently, a Mithril network has only one aggregator, which serves snapshots from a secure cloud location operated by IOG and is therefore assumed to be trustworthy. In the future, as Mithril networks become more decentralized, multiple aggregators will operate independently. This increased decentralization could raise the risk of a malicious aggregator distributing a tampered ledger state.

Patches

As a mitigation, the Mithril aggregator now signs the ledger state snapshot and the latest immutable file using an IOG-owned key, and the client library and CLI validate the signature of these files upon download.

  • The Mithril client library has been fixed with version 0.12.2, previous versions must not be used anymore.
  • The Mithril client CLI has been fixed with version 0.12.1, previous versions must not be used anymore.
  • The Mithril aggregator has been fixed with version 0.7.44, previous versions must not be used anymore.

References

References

@jpraynaud jpraynaud published to input-output-hk/mithril May 7, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 7, 2025
Reviewed May 7, 2025
Last updated May 7, 2025

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
Low

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L

EPSS score

Weaknesses

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-qv97-5qr8-2266
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