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| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +title: 'Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #71' |
| 3 | +permalink: /en/newsletters/2019/11/06/ |
| 4 | +name: 2019-11-06-newsletter |
| 5 | +slug: 2019-11-06-newsletter |
| 6 | +type: newsletter |
| 7 | +layout: newsletter |
| 8 | +lang: en |
| 9 | +--- |
| 10 | +This week's newsletter requests help testing a Bitcoin Core release |
| 11 | +candidate, summarizes continued discussion of LN anchor outputs, and |
| 12 | +describes a proposal for allowing full nodes and lightweight clients to |
| 13 | +signal support for IP address relay. Also included is our regular |
| 14 | +section about notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure |
| 15 | +projects. |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +{% comment %}<!-- include references.md below the fold but above any Jekyll/Liquid variables-->{% endcomment %} |
| 18 | +{% include references.md %} |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +## Action items |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +- **Help test Bitcoin Core release candidate:** experienced users are |
| 23 | + encouraged to help test the latest release candidates for the upcoming |
| 24 | + version of [Bitcoin Core][Bitcoin Core 0.19.0]. |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +## News |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +- **Continued discussion of LN anchor outputs:** as described in [last |
| 29 | + week's newsletter][news70 simplified commitments], LN developers are |
| 30 | + working on allowing either party to a channel to CPFP fee bump |
| 31 | + settlement transactions, taking advantage of the CPFP carve-out |
| 32 | + mempool policy that's expected to be released as part of Bitcoin Core |
| 33 | + 0.19.0. Topics discussed this week on both the [mailing list][jager |
| 34 | + anchor] and the [BOLTs repository][bolts #688] included: |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | + - Whether both the party unilaterally closing the channel (the |
| 37 | + "local" party) and the other party ("remote") should experience |
| 38 | + the same delay before being able to claim their funds, or whether |
| 39 | + they should each be able to negotiate during the channel creation |
| 40 | + process for the delay duration to use when they're the remote |
| 41 | + party. Currently, only the local party is delayed and there's |
| 42 | + concern that this may result in some people trying to manipulate |
| 43 | + the other party to close the channel so that the manipulator will |
| 44 | + receive their funds faster. |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | + - What script to use for the anchor outputs. It was previously |
| 47 | + proposed that the script should contain a clause that allows |
| 48 | + anyone to spend it after a suitable delay in order to prevent |
| 49 | + polluting the UTXO set with many small-value outputs. However, |
| 50 | + this is complicated by the script possibly needing to contain a |
| 51 | + unique pubkey which won't be known by third parties, preventing |
| 52 | + them from being able to independently generate the witness script |
| 53 | + necessary to spend the P2WSH output. |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | + - What amount of bitcoin value to use for the anchor outputs. The |
| 56 | + person who initiates channel opening is responsible for paying |
| 57 | + this amount (as they are responsible for paying all fees in the |
| 58 | + current protocol), so they would probably like to keep it |
| 59 | + low---but the amount must be greater than most node's minimum |
| 60 | + output amount ("dust limit"). There was discussion about whether |
| 61 | + or not this should be a configurable amount. |
| 62 | + |
| 63 | + - Whether each LN payment should pay different public keys (using |
| 64 | + pubkey tweaking). Removing key tweaking was proposed to reduce |
| 65 | + the amount of state tracking necessary, but a concern was raised that |
| 66 | + this would make the channel state too deterministic. This could |
| 67 | + allow a watchtower that received a series of encrypted breach |
| 68 | + remedy transactions from one side of a channel to be able to |
| 69 | + decrypt not just the needed breach remedy transaction but all |
| 70 | + other breach remedy transactions from that channel---allowing the |
| 71 | + watchtower to reconstruct the amounts and hash locks used for each |
| 72 | + payment in that channel, significantly reducing privacy. |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | + Discussion remains ongoing as solutions to the above concerns are |
| 75 | + suggested and the proposal receives additional review. |
| 76 | + |
| 77 | +- **Signaling support for address relay:** full nodes share the IP |
| 78 | + addresses of other full nodes they've heard about with their peers |
| 79 | + using the P2P protocol's `addr` (address) message, enabling fully |
| 80 | + decentralized peer discovery. SPV clients can also use this mechanism |
| 81 | + to learn about full nodes, although most clients currently use some |
| 82 | + form of centralized peer discovery and so `addr` messages sent to those |
| 83 | + clients are wasted bandwidth. |
| 84 | + |
| 85 | + Gleb Naumenko sent an [email][naumenko addr relay] to the |
| 86 | + Bitcoin-Dev mailing list suggesting that nodes and clients should |
| 87 | + signal to their peers whether or not they want to participate in |
| 88 | + address relay. This will avoid wasting bandwidth on clients that |
| 89 | + don't want the addresses and can make it easier to determine the |
| 90 | + consequences of certain network behavior related to address relay. |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | + Two methods are proposed for allowing nodes to indicate whether or |
| 93 | + not they want to participate in address relay---a per-node method |
| 94 | + and a per-connection method. The per-node method could easily build |
| 95 | + on top of work already being done for addrv2 messages (see [Newsletter |
| 96 | + #37][news37 addrv2]), but it would be less flexible than the |
| 97 | + per-connection method. In particular, the per-connection method |
| 98 | + could allow a node to dedicate some connections to transaction relay |
| 99 | + and other connections to address relay, producing possible privacy |
| 100 | + advantages. Naumenko's email requests feedback on which method would |
| 101 | + be preferred by implementers of both full nodes and lightweight |
| 102 | + clients. |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +## Notable code and documentation changes |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +*Notable changes this week in [Bitcoin Core][bitcoin core repo], |
| 107 | +[C-Lightning][c-lightning repo], [Eclair][eclair repo], [LND][lnd repo], |
| 108 | +[libsecp256k1][libsecp256k1 repo], [Bitcoin Improvement Proposals |
| 109 | +(BIPs)][bips repo], and [Lightning BOLTs][bolts repo].* |
| 110 | + |
| 111 | +- [Bitcoin Core #16943][] adds a `generatetodescriptor` RPC that allows |
| 112 | + new blocks generated during testing (e.g. in regtest mode) to pay a |
| 113 | + script represented by an [output script descriptor][]. Prior to this |
| 114 | + change, only the `generatetoaddress` RPC was available and it can only |
| 115 | + pay P2PKH, P2SH, or P2WSH addresses. |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | +- [C-Lightning #3220][] begins always creating signatures with a low *r* |
| 118 | + value, reducing the maximum size of the signature by one byte and |
| 119 | + saving about 0.125 vbytes on average per C-Lightning peer in onchain |
| 120 | + transactions. Bitcoin Core also previously adopted this change to its |
| 121 | + wallet's signature-generation code (see [Newsletter #8][news8 lowr]). |
| 122 | + |
| 123 | +- [LND #3558][] synthesizes a unified policy for any case where two |
| 124 | + particular nodes have multiple channels open between them and then |
| 125 | + uses this unified policy when considering routing through any of |
| 126 | + those channels. [BOLT4][bolt4 non-strict rec] recommends that multiple channels |
| 127 | + between the same nodes should all use the same policy, but this |
| 128 | + doesn't always happen, so this change tries to determine "the greatest |
| 129 | + common denominator of all policies" between the nodes. Using a single |
| 130 | + policy reduces the number of routes the node needs to evaluate when |
| 131 | + making a payment. |
| 132 | + |
| 133 | +- [LND #3556][] adds a new `queryprob` RPC that returns the expected |
| 134 | + probability that a payment would succeed given a particular |
| 135 | + source node, destination node, and payment amount. This replaces functionality previously |
| 136 | + removed from the `querymc` RPC. |
| 137 | + |
| 138 | +- [BOLTs #660][] updates [BOLT1][] to reserve Type-Length-Value (TLV) |
| 139 | + type identifiers less than 2<sup>16</sup> for types defined in the |
| 140 | + LN specification (the BOLT documents). The remaining values may be |
| 141 | + used freely as custom records by any LN implementation. The updated |
| 142 | + specification also now provides guidance on how to select numbers for |
| 143 | + custom record types. |
| 144 | + |
| 145 | +{% include linkers/issues.md issues="16943,3558,3556,660,3220,688" %} |
| 146 | +[bitcoin core 0.19.0]: https://bitcoincore.org/bin/bitcoin-core-0.19.0/ |
| 147 | +[bolt4 non-strict rec]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#recommendation |
| 148 | +[news37 addrv2]: /en/newsletters/2019/03/12/#version-2-addr-message-proposed |
| 149 | +[news8 lowr]: /en/newsletters/2018/08/14/#bitcoin-core-wallet-to-begin-only-creating-low-r-signatures |
| 150 | +[naumenko addr relay]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-October/017428.html |
| 151 | +[news70 simplified commitments]: /en/newsletters/2019/10/30/#ln-simplified-commitments |
| 152 | +[jager anchor]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-October/002264.html |
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